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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appellee, K. Norman Cox, Defendant, submits the following 
brief of Appellee in this matter. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
In divorce proceedings, this Court may not disturb the trial 
court's determinations, absent a showing of clear abuse of 
discretion. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Ut. App. 1990) . 
Additionally, this Court must place a presumption of validity upon 
the trial court's actions. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 
(Ut. 1985) . Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991) . 
The burden of proof is on Plaintiff to show error or absence 
of discretion, and this Court may only overturn the trial court's 
Findings of Fact if they are clearly erroneous—that is, the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary and is against the 
clear weight of evidence, or unless the Court reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Dunn v. Dunn, 
802 P.2d at 1317. 
Moreover, even where the trial court has failed to enter 
findings on all material issues, if the facts in the record are 
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting a finding in favor 
of the trial court's judgment, the trial court's judgment will not 
be disturbed on appeal. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P. 2d 917, 924 (Ut. 
App. 1989). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The facts set forth below were established by the testimony 
and evidence presented at trial on August 31, 1992, and the 
Decision and Findings of Fact of the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, 
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District Court Judge for the Fourth Judicial District Court for 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married for fewer than three 
years. The parties were married for 29 months, from July 1, 1988, 
to their separation on December 1, 1990. (Findings of Fact, p. 2, 
par. 3; Judge Davis7 Decision, pp. 4, 14; Trial Transcript, p. 60, 
11. 4-11," p. 145, 11. 2-5). 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were older in years, both parties 
had been married before, and no children were born as issue of the 
marriage. At the time of their marriage, Appellant was 4 7 years of 
age and Respondent was 56. This was Plaintiff's third marriage and 
Defendant's second marriage. (Findings of Fact, p. 2, par. 4; 
Judge Davis7 Decision, pp. 4-14; Trial Transcript, p. 59, 11. 
17-25, p. 60, 11. 15-17, p. 144, 11. 13-19, p. 145, 11. 6-8). 
3. Defendant brought his unencumbered premarital home into 
the marriage. In 1966, Defendant and his deceased former wife 
built a house in Orem, Utah. Defendant paid off a 2 0-year VA 
mortgage on the home sometime in 1987. As of the date of the 
parties' marriage on July 1, 1988, the home and property were 
unencumbered by mortgage or lien. (Findings of Fact, p. 2, par. 5; 
Judge Davis' Decision, pp. 7, 14; Trial Transcript, pp. 142-143, 
11. 1-25, 1-8) . 
4. Plaintiff's remodeling expenditures did not increase the 
value of Defendant's premarital home. The parties stipulated 
before trial that the value of Respondent's home prior to marriage 
and prior to remodeling was $77,000.00. The Court determined that 
at the date of separation the fair market value of Defendant's 
premarital home was $105,000.00. Plaintiff contributed $12,562.65. 
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The court determined that award as follows: $18,062.65 contributed 
by Plaintiff minus $5,500.00 reimbursed to Plaintiff by Defendant. 
Defendant contributed $11,931.00 towards remodeling Defendant's 
home. The value of Respondent's premarital home in 1988 plus the 
amount the parties paid toward the remodeling, or a total of 
$106,993.65, exceeds the $105,000.00 fair market value of the home. 
(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 7, pp. 4-5, par. 12-13; Judge Davis' 
Decision, pp. 4, 7, 16-17). 
5. Prior to the parties' marriage, Plaintiff sold her 
premarital residence against the advice of Defendant and her 
brother-in-law, an accountant. In June 1988, against the advice of 
Defendant and Plaintiff's accountant, Plaintiff sold her personal 
residence to her parents, Smith and Lee Jacobs. From the 
$21,000.00 proceeds received from that sale, Plaintiff repaid her 
parents the $18,000.00 she had borrowed from them to purchase the 
home. (Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 6; Judge Davis' Decision, p. 
7; Trial Transcript, pp. 145-146, 11. 9-25, 1-14). 
6. Defendant intended to protect his separate premarital 
home under the provisions of an Antenuptial Agreement, and 
Plaintiff had knowledge of and acquiesced to Defendants intent. 
At Plaintiff's behest, the parties met with Plaintiff's attorney on 
or about June 23, 1988. At this time, Plaintiff's attorney had 
knowledge that Defendant was represented by counsel. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 107, 11. 6-21, p. 113, 11. 23-25, p. 114, 11. 4-8, 
p. 148, 11. 4-6.) Plaintiff's attorney drafted an Antinuptual 
Agreement so that it required the signatures of Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's attorney and the signatures of Defendant and his 
attorney. (Trial Transcript, p. 98, 11. 21-25, p. 99, 11. 1-5, p. 
s:\mbf\15102 3 
114, 11. 11-16). Plaintiff executed the Antenuptial Agreement on 
June 28, 1988, and Defendant executed the Antenuptial Agreement on 
June 30, 1988. Defendant intended for his premarital assets, 
including his premarital home, to be protected under the provisions 
of the Antenuptial Agreement, and Plaintiff admitted at trial that 
she had knowledge of Defendant's intent to protect his premarital 
home. This fact was substantiated by the testimony of Plaintiff's 
attorney at trial. (Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 8; Judge Davis' 
Decision, p. 6; Transcript, p. 70, 11. 6-11, p. 72, 11. 12-15, p. 
126, 11. 20-22, p. 130, 11. 3-7, p. 130-131, 11. 23-24, 1-6, p. 
151-152, 11. 15-25, 1-4, p. 157, 11. 8-13). 
7. Defendant intended the Warranty Deed to secure only the 
amount of Plaintiff's remodeling expenditures. Nearly contempora-
neous with the parties' signing of the Antenuptial Agreement, 
Defendant executed a joint deed to his premarital home and placed 
Plaintiff's name on the title to the home intending to secure 
monies Plaintiff paid or would pay toward the remodeling of the 
home. At no time was Defendant's attorney present at any of the 
meetings held between the parties and Plaintiff's attorney, nor did 
Plaintiff's attorney send the Warranty Deed to Defendant's attorney 
for his review. Moreover, at no time did Plaintiff's attorney 
confer with Defendant's attorney regarding the propriety of placing 
Plaintiff's name on the title to Defendant's unencumbered home. 
(Findings of Fact, pp. 3-4, par. 9-10; Judge Davis' Decision, pp. 
6-7, 16; Trial Transcript, p. 115, 11. 1-4, 8-11, p. 131, 11. 
18-20, p. 201, 11. 10-23). 
8. Plaintiff has been employed at all times relevant hereto, 
while Defendant has been unemployed since October, 1991. Plaintiff 
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has continuously been employed by Brigham Young University in a 
secretarial position since the parties were married on July 1, 
1988. Plaintiff's gross monthly income as of September 1992 was 
$1,850.00. By comparison, Defendant has been unemployed since he 
sold his business in October 1991, and his only income as of trial 
was $554.00 per month from unemployment compensation. 
9. Defendant suffers from a physical disability which 
precludes him from seeking full-time employment in his area of 
training. Defendant suffers from a physical disability which 
necessitated recent knee operations. It is expected that Defendant 
will be immobilized for six months, and Defendant's disability will 
preclude him from seeking full-time employment in his area of 
training—auto-body repair. (Findings of Fact, p. 6; Judge Davis' 
Decision, p. 2; Trial Transcript, pp. 169-171, 11. 12-25, 1-25, 
1-6) . 
10. On August 30, 1992, prior to trial of this matter, the 
parties negotiated and entered into a stipulation of Facts with the 
advice and consent of counsel. The stipulated facts were adopted 
by the trial court and incorporated into its Findings of Fact, 
Divorce Decree and Decision. (Findings of Fact, p. 1; Divorce 
Decree, p. 1; Judge Davis' Decision, pp. 4-6). 
11. On August 31, 1992# the divorce proceeding between 
Plaintiff and Defendant came before the lower Court for trial. The 
only issues before the lower Court were: (1) the award of alimony; 
(2) approval of the parties' stipulation of facts entered into on 
August 30, 1992; (3) the fair and equitable division of Defendant's 
premarital home; and (4) the award of attorneys' fees. 
12. The lower Court ruled that: 
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a. Alimony is not merited since Defendant has no 
reasonable or foreseeable ability to obtain employment nor to 
pay alimony due to his unemployment and physical disability. 
b. The parties' August 30, 1992, Stipulation of facts 
would be adopted by the Court to resolve all issues relative 
to the personal property division and the parties7 financial 
obligations. The parties had negotiated and entered into the 
stipulation with the advice of counsel. 
c. Defendant's premarital home did not increase in 
value since the value of Defendant's premarital home in 1988 
plus the amount the parties paid toward the remodeling 
exceeded the appraised value of the home. 
d. Plaintiff is not entitled to one-half the value of 
Defendant's premarital home and that Plaintiff had no life 
estate. 
e. Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for her 
actual pre-marriage and post-marriage expenditures for 
remodeling of the home in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65. 
f• Defendant is awarded his attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred subsequent to August 12, 1992. 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
The trial court's decision as to the four issues listed above 
should be upheld. 
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IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF #S 
REQUEST FOR ALIMONY. 
1. This Court Should Not Disturb The Trial Court's 
Alimony Ruling Absent Abuse Of Discretion. 
This Court has held that trial courts have broad discretion in 
awarding alimony. Oscruthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P. 2d 895, 896 (Ut. 
App. 1990) . As long as a trial court exercises its discretion 
within the bounds and under the standards this Court has set and 
supports its decision with adequate findings and conclusions, this 
Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling. Narani o v. 
Naranio, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1147 (Ut. App. 1988) . The burden of proof 
is upon the plaintiff that a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is shown in the court's decision. Bridenbaugh v. 
Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d (Ut. App. 1990). 
In awarding alimony, this Court has required trial courts to 
consider the following three factors: (1) the financial conditions 
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and 
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 78 (Ut. App. 1991); Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Ut. App. 1990); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 
421, 423 (Ut. App. 1990); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Ut. 
App. 1990) . If these three factors have been considered by the 
trial court, this Court will not disturb the trial court's alimony 
decision unless a serious inequity has resulted so as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion or manifest injustice may occur. 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989), and Haumont 
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v. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424. See also Watson v. Watson, 194 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. August 24, 1992). 
This Court has further noted that the three-prong criterion 
set forth above does not preclude the trial court from considering 
other factors such as the length of marriage, the parties7 ages at 
marriage, whether children were born into the marriage, etc. 
Rapp1eye"v. Rapp1eye, 1993 WL 212747 (Ut. App.); Boyle v. Boyle, 
735 P. 2d 669, 671 (Ut. App. 1987) (holding that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying alimony to the wife following 
a short-term marriage). 
Applying these factors to the situation at bar, the trial 
court properly denied Plaintiff's request for alimony. 
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
Because It Addressed All Requisite Factors In 
Determining Alimony Was Not Merited. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying her alimony claim. Plaintiff argues that the trial 
court did not properly consider Defendant's ability to provide 
support. However, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the trial 
court addressed the above-noted requisite factors in the following 
detail. 
a. The trial court considered the circumstances 
surrounding the parties' marriage and 
concluded that alimony was not merited. 
From the day they were married to the date of their final 
separation, the parties were only married for 29 months. At the 
time of their marriage, Plaintiff was 47 years old and Defendant 
was 56 years old. This was Plaintiff's third marriage and 
Defendant's second. No children were born into the marriage. 
(Findings of Fact, p. 2, par. 3-4; Memorandum Decision, pp. 4, 14) . 
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b. The trial court considered both parties' 
abilities to produce income and found that 
Plaintiff's ability to produce income exceeds 
that of Defendant. 
Plaintiff has continuously been employed by Brigham Young 
University in a secretarial position since 1985. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 80, 11. 8-11). Plaintiff's wages have 
steadily increased during the marriage, and Plaintiff testified 
that there is a reasonable expectation that they will continue to 
do so. (Memorandum Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 81, 1. 23 through p. 
82 1. 7). As of the date of trial, Plaintiff's gross monthly 
income was $1,850.00 from which Plaintiff was depositing approxi-
mately $27.00 per paycheck, or $54.00 a month, into a B.Y.U.-
sponsored retirement and savings account.17 It should also be 
noted that as of July 1992, one month prior to the date of trial, 
Plaintiff was depositing from her gross income approximately $64.75 
per paycheck, or $129.50 a month, into her B.Y.U.-sponsored 
retirement and savings account. (Tr., p. 45, 11. 18-22). 
* In what seems to be an attempt by Plaintiff to confuse the 
Court, Plaintiff argues in her Appellant Brief that her income at 
the time of marriage was $1,008.58 net per month, that she spent 
one-half the sum she received for her son's social security on 
behalf of the marriage, and that she liquidated her separate 
property assets and paid the proceeds therefrom to her children and 
in support of the marital community. Plaintiff's earnings at the 
time of marriage and her expenditures during marriage are irrele-
vant for purposes of an alimony award. Howell v. Howell, 806 P. 2d 
1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that trial courts must look to 
the standard of living existing at or near the time of trial in 
determining alimony). In reaching its determination that alimony 
was not warranted in this case, the trial court took notice of both 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's incomes and expenses as of the date of 
trial. Plaintiff's above-noted arguments do nothing more than 
validate the trial court's findings that the parties' standard of 
living during marriage was financed by the liquidation by both 
parties of separate property assets and the incurrence of debt. 
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After the parties' final separation, Plaintiff purchased a 
condominium, encumbering herself with a mortgage. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 3) .lf 
Even though Plaintiff may have financial need for support, due 
to her younger age and higher salary, Plaintiff has both the 
opportunity and ability to recoup her losses and provide for 
herself, while Defendant's age and health may prevent him from 
securing steady, full-time employment, (Memorandum Decision, p. 
15) . 
c. The trial court found that Defendant, because 
of his physical disabilities, has no reason-
ably foreseeable ability to obtain employment 
and pay alimony. 
Defendant has been unemployed in a full-time position since 
October 1991 when he was forced to sell his separate property 
business at a substantial loss. (Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 159, 11. 6-11). Due to a 
slowdown in his business and because of his deteriorating health, 
Defendant had no other alternative than to sell his business. 
(Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3; p. 15; Tr., p. 192, 11. 15-20; p. 
200, 11. 8-18). 
Other than working part-time for a brief period at Utah Valley 
Community College, Defendant has remained unemployed. (Memorandum 
-
1
 Plaintiff claims that, as of trial, she was receiving from her 
church monthly food assistance and monies to pay the mortgage on 
her condominium. Even if Plaintiff's allegation is true, Plaintiff 
fails to take into consideration that Defendant was unemployed at 
the time of trial and still is unemployed as of this date, that 
Defendant's physical disability precludes him from employment in 
his area of expertise, and that Defendant was receiving $500.00 to 
$600.00 per month from his children in order to meet his financial 
obligations. (Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum 
Decision, pp. 2-4). 
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Decision, p. 2; Tr., p. 192, 11. 25 through p. 193, 1. 24). Even 
though Defendant was withdrawing $1,457.00 in salary a month prior 
to the sale of his business, Defendant's income as of the date of 
trial, almost 12 months later, was solely that of unemployment 
compensation in the amount of $554.00 per month, plus the receipt 
of proceeds from the sale of his separate property business in the 
amount of $500.00 per month.17 (Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 2-3; Tr., p. 159, 11. 2-21; p. 172, 11. 8-
18; p. 173, 11. 20-24; p. 175, 11. 11-23). In order to meet his 
monthly financial obligations of $1,370.00, Defendant has had to 
borrow $500.00 to $600.00 per month from his children, sell most of 
his marketable separate property assets, and incur substantial 
debt.17 (Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 20; Memorandum Decision, pp. 
2-3; Tr., p. 161, 11. 7-17; p. 172, 11. 16-19). 
As noted above, Defendant suffers from knee problems which 
preclude him from seeking full-time employment in his area of 
training, auto-body repair. (Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; 
Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3, 15; Tr., p. 170, 11. 3-5; p. 193, 1. 
25 through p. 195, 11. 1-4). Furthermore, both of Defendant's 
knees were operated on in May 1993. It is expected that Defendant 
^ As the trial court correctly notes in its Findings of Fact and 
Memorandum Decision, Defendant's unemployment benefits commenced 
the second week of July 1992 and terminated the second week of 
January 1993. (Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 2-3) . It should also be noted that Defendant received 
the last payment from the sale of his business in May 1993. 
17
 Defendant sold off numerous personal items (a gun collection, 
snowmobiles, cars, etc.) and assumed new loans during the marriage 
in an attempt to finance the parties' marriage. At the time of 
trial, most of Defendant's marketable separate property had been 
sold. (Memorandum Decision, p. 3; Tr., p. 161, 11. 7-17). 
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will be immobilized for approximately six months. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 2; Tr., p. 170, 11. 11-17). 
d. The trial court found that Defendant 
experienced a higher dollar net worth decrease 
than did Plaintiff. 
Based on the Stipulation of Facts the parties presented at 
trial, and after evaluating the evidence presented at trial, the 
trial court found the following facts: 
Prior to the marriage, Plaintiff had a net worth of 
$74,000.00. (Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 7; Memorandum Decision, 
p. 5). During the marriage, Plaintiff expended $74,000.00. 
(Findings of Fact, p. 5, par. 14; Memorandum Decision, p. 5). 
Plaintiff's net worth at the time of the parties' final separation 
was $10,539.00 (exclusive of the $12,562.65 the trial court ordered 
Defendant to repay to Plaintiff in the Divorce Decree); therefore, 
her net decrease was $63,461.00. (Findings of Fact, p. 5, par. 15; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 5). Plaintiff's net decrease takes into 
consideration the following expenditures: (1) prior to marriage 
Plaintiff repaid to her parents $18,000.00 on a loan she had 
received from them to purchase her premarital home; (2) during 
marriage, Plaintiff paid or gave $31,000.00 of her separate 
property assets to her children; and (3) prior to and after 
marriage, Plaintiff paid the total sum of $12,562.65 toward the 
remodeling of Defendant's premarital home. (Findings of Fact, p. 
3, par. 7; pp. 4-5, par. 12, 14-15; Memorandum Decision, pp. 4-
-
7
 Subtracting the amount Plaintiff repaid to her parents on the 
premarital loan, the amount she paid or gave to her children during 
marriage, and the amount Defendant was ordered to repay to her for 
her remodeling expenditures, Plaintiff liquidated and expended 
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On the other hand, Defendant had a net decrease of $135,709.00 
during the parties7 marriage. (Findings of Fact, p. 5, par. 15; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 5). Defendant's net worth at the time of 
marriage was $3 68,000.00. (Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 7; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 5) . Defendant expended $109,114.45 during 
the marriage. (Findings of Fact, p. 5, par. 14; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 6). Defendant's net worth at the time of separation 
was $232,249.00, and his net decrease was $135,709.00 or double 
that of Plaintiff's net decrease. (Findings of Fact, p. 5, par. 
15; Memorandum Decision, p. 5) . 
In its thorough consideration of the foregoing factors, the 
trial court entered its fact-specific decision. There is no abuse 
of discretion in the decision rendered. This Court should affirm 
the opinion of the trial court and deny Plaintiff's request for 
alimony. 
3. Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish That The Trial 
Court7 s Findings Are Inecruitable. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the burden is on the 
party challenging the trial court's factual findings to demonstrate 
that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings 
or that the findings are otherwise clearly erroneous. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Ut. 1989) .^ Plaintiff has failed 
to demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
approximately $1,898.35 from her separate property funds on the 
parties' marriage. 
-' Should this Court hold otherwise, this Court would be second-
guessing the trial court's reasons for finding as it did without 
the advantage of observing witnesses first-hand and assessing their 
credibility. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991) . 
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findings. Plaintiff has also failed to cite any authority which 
supports her erroneous contentions. 
In her Appellate Brief, Plaintiff argues that the trial court 
erred: (1) in concluding that Defendant's medical disability 
precluded him from performing auto-body work; (2) in concluding 
that Defendant's income was $554.00 a month; and (3) in failing to 
take into consideration other factors regarding the parties and 
their marriage. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any evidence to 
support these conclusions. Plaintiff is mistaken in each and all 
of her contentions. 
a. Defendant's Medical Disability Precluded Him 
From Performing Auto-body Work. 
With respect to Defendant's medical disability, Defendant 
testified that his doctor informed him that his knees were no 
longer functional and that sometime in the near future Defendant 
would need to have them replaced. (Tr., p. 193, 1. 25 through p. 
195, 11. 1-4). Defendant further testified that his knee problem 
impaired his ability to find employment. (Tr., p. 169, 11. 18-20) . 
In Boyle, 735 P.2d at 671, this Court held that trial courts 
are clearly in the best position to weigh the evidence, determine 
credibility, and arrive at factual conclusions. In this case, the 
trial court weighed the evidence before it, determined the 
credibility of Defendant as a witness, and thereafter concluded 
that Defendant does suffer from a physical disability which 
prohibits him from performing the type of work to which he is 
accustomed. The trial court's finding is also supported by the 
fact that Defendant has been unable to procure full-time employment 
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in the auto-body industry since the date of trial. As such, the 
trial court's conclusions should not be disturbed. 
b. Defendant's Income Was $554.00 Per Month. 
As to Plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in 
determining Defendant's monthly income, this Court has held that 
trial courts must determine the parties' standard of living which 
existed at or near the time of trial. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 
1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991). The trial court determined that at 
the time of trial, Defendant's sole income was $554.00 from 
unemployment insurance, and that Defendant had no other income. In 
Cummincrs v. Cummincrs, 562 P.2d 229, 231 (Ut. 1977), and Westenskow 
v. Westenskow, 562 P. 2d 1256, 1257 (Ut. 1977), the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that a trial court may consider a husband's historical 
earning ability only where a husband has experienced a temporary 
decrease in income. The key word in the Cumminqs and Westenskow 
decisions is "temporary." Defendant's decrease was not temporary. 
Defendant has been unemployed in his area of expertise since 
October 1991, the date he sold his business. (Findings of Fact, 
p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 159, 11. 6-11). 
Even though Defendant was earning $1,457.00 a month, prior to the 
sale of his business, Defendant's only income as of the date of 
trial, almost 12 months later, was unemployment compensation in the 
amount of $554.00 per month. (Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; 
Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3). Accordingly, due to Defendant's 
physical disability and the fact that Defendant had been unemployed 
for close to a year at the time of trial, the trial court properly 
concluded that Defendant's historical income was too remote to be 
relied upon in determining whether to award Plaintiff alimony. As 
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such, the trial court properly considered Defendant's income at the 
time of trial; that was $554.00 per month. 
C* The Trial Court Took Into Consideration Other 
Factors Regarding The Parties And Their 
Marriage. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's contention that the trial court failed 
to take into consideration other factors regarding the parties and 
their marriage, the trial court's findings clearly demonstrate that 
the trial court considered: (1) the length of the marriage; 
(2) the parties' ages upon marriage; (3) the fact that no children 
were born into the marriage; (4) that both parties had been married 
before; (5) the value of both parties' estates upon marriage; 
(6) the amount expended by each party during marriage; and (7) the 
amount each parties' estate decreased as of their final separation. 
In spite of the trial court's above-referenced considerations 
and findings, Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have 
awarded her alimony from the equity in Defendant's premarital 
home.27 In support of this contention, Plaintiff relies on 
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P. 2d 616 (Ut. App. 1988), a case 
factually distinguishable from the circumstances at hand. In 
Sampinos, this Court affirmed the lower court's decision to award 
the wife alimony where the wife had not worked for the last eight 
years of the 11-year marriage and had no external source of income. 
Unlike Plaintiff, the wife in Sampinos had devoted her time as a 
homemaker, and she had no professional training and few marketable 
2/
 Plaintiff fails to take into consideration that the trial 
court ordered Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff $12,562.65, the 
amount she contributed to the remodeling of the home. (Divorce 
Decree, p. 2, par. 5). 
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skills. Furthermore, the husband, unlike Defendant, had the 
ability to support his wife. Id. at 618-19. 
In contrast to the facts of the Sampinos case, the trial 
court, after addressing all the relevant factors, denied 
Plaintiff's claim to alimony. The trial court determined that due 
to Plaintiff's younger age and higher salary, Plaintiff has an 
opportunity and ability to provide for herself and to recoup some 
of her losses, in contrast to Defendant, whose age and health may 
prevent him from securing steady, full-time employment. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 15). Finally, because Defendant's 
premarital home is a separate property asset controlled by the 
parties' Antenuptial Agreement, Plaintiff is not entitled to 
alimony based on the equity of Defendant's home. 
Because the trial court's findings are supported by the 
evidence before it, and especially in light of the short duration 
of the marriage, this Court must conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff alimony. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUEST FOR ONE-HALF OF DEFENDANTS PREMARITAL HOME AND 
ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO RECONVEY HER INTEREST IN THE HOME 
TO DEFENDANT. 
This Court is called upon to determine whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's request for one-half 
the value of Defendant's premarital home and ordering Plaintiff to 
reconvey her interest in the home to Defendant. 
Considerable latitude is given trial courts in adjusting 
financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to 
a presumption of validity. Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P. 2d 120, 121 (Ut. 
App. 1992). Moreover, this Court will not modify a trial court's 
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property division determination unless there has been a misunder-
standing or misapplication of the law, resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, that the evidence is against the clear weight of 
evidence, or such a serious inequity would result as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. Id. 
Utah courts have held that upon divorce, each party should 
retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage. 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1300 (Ut. App. 1990) . In making a 
property division, a trial court should take into consideration all 
of the pertinent circumstances of the parties' marriage. Woodward 
v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431, 432 (Ut. 1982); Jackson v. Jackson, 
617 P. 2d 338, 340-41 (Ut. 1980); English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 
410 (Ut. 1977). 
The pertinent circumstances the trial court must consider are: 
(1) the duration of the marriage; (2) the parties' ages at the time 
of the marriage; (3) the parties' ages at the time of divorce; 
(4) whether any children were born into the marriage; (5) the 
amount and kind of property to be divided, whether the property was 
acquired before or during the marriage and the source of the 
property; (6) the parties' standard of living, respective financial 
conditions, needs and earning capacity; and (7) the health of the 
parties. Hogue, 831 P.2d at 121. 
1. The Trial Court Considered All Of The Pertinent 
Circumstances Of The Parties' Marriage In Reaching 
Its Property Distribution Decision. 
In awarding Defendant the entire interest to his premarital 
separate property home, the trial court, in its Findings of Fact 
and Memorandum Decision, plainly contemplated all of the pertinent 
circumstances in formulating an equitable distribution of property 
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between Plaintiff and Defendant. Specifically, the trial court 
noted that the parties had entered into a Stipulation of Facts 
which resolved all property disputes except for the division of 
Defendant's premarital home. (Memorandum Decision, p. 8) . The 
trial court adopted the parties' Stipulation of Facts and incorpo-
rated the same in its Findings of Fact, Divorce Decree and 
Memorandum Decision. 
The facts and circumstances the trial court considered in 
reaching its decision are set forth in Defendant's Alimony argument 
above and herein below. 
a. Defendant brought his unencumbered premarital 
home into the marriage. 
In 1966, Defendant built the home in question. Defendant and 
his deceased former wife raised nine children in this house and 
paid off a 20-year VA mortgage some time in 1987. In May 1988, to 
accommodate Plaintiff and Defendant's sons and daughters, who were 
still living at home, the parties' began remodeling Defendant's 
premarital home. As of the date of the parties marriage on July 1, 
1988, the home and property were unencumbered by mortgage or lien. 
(Findings of Fact, p. 2, par. 5; Memorandum Decision, pp. 7 and 14; 
Tr., p. 142, 1. 1 through p. 143 11. 1-8). 
b. Plaintiff seeks to obtain a substantially 
greater amount of money than she paid toward 
the remodeling of Defendant's premarital home. 
The amount Plaintiff seeks to obtain is $52,500.00 being one-
half the trial court's determined value of the home. That demand 
substantially exceeds the amount Plaintiff paid toward the 
remodeling of Defendant's premarital home, which was $12,562.65. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 14). 
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c. Prior to the marriage, Plaintiff sold her 
premarital residence. 
In June 1988, against the advice of Defendant and Plaintiff's 
accountant, Plaintiff sold her personal residence to her parents. 
From the $21,000.00 proceeds from the sale, Plaintiff repaid her 
parents the $18,000.00 she had borrowed from them to purchase the 
home. (Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 6; Memorandum Decision p. 7; 
Tr., p. 145, 1. 9 through p. 146, 1. 14). 
d. Prior to marriage, the parties entered into a 
valid Antenuptial Agreement, the parties 
intended for Defendant's premarital home to be 
protected under the provisions of the 
Antenuptial Agreement, and the protection 
provided by the Antenuptial Agreement was not 
abrogated by Defendant's execution of the 
Warranty Deed. 
In addition to the foregoing facts and circumstances, the 
trial court also took into consideration the circumstances 
surrounding the parties execution of an Antenuptial Agreement and 
Defendant's execution of a Warranty Deed prior to the date of the 
parties' marriage. Relative to the Antenuptial Agreement, the 
Court found the following: 
(1) The Antenuptial Agreement executed by the 
parties was not subject to fraud# 
coercion or material non-disclosure. 
The parties entered into the Agreement upon Plaintiff's 
request, Plaintiff's attorney drafted the Agreement, the parties 
were competent, the Agreement was duly signed and notarized, and as 
consideration therefor, both parties' separate property was 
protected. (Memorandum Decision, pp. 8-9) . Additionally, 
Plaintiff's own attorney signed the Agreement and certified that he 
had consulted with Plaintiff and advised her of her property rights 
and the legal significance of the Agreement. (Findings of Fact, p. 
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4, par. 10; Memorandum Decision, p. 9). Accordingly, the 
Antenuptial Agreement was not subject to fraud, coercion, or 
material non-disclosure. (Memorandum Decision, p. 8). 
(2) Defendant intended to protect his 
separate premarital home under the 
provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement 
and Plaintiff had knowledge of and 
acquiesced to Defendant's intent. 
Plaintiff executed the Antenuptial Agreement on June 28, 1988, 
and Defendant executed the Antenuptial Agreement on June 30, 1988. 
(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 8; Memorandum Decision, pp. 8 and 16; 
Tr., p. 126, 11. 20-22). Defendant intended for his premarital 
assets, including his premarital home, to be protected under the 
provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement, and Plaintiff had 
knowledge of and acquiesced to Defendant's intent to protect his 
premarital home. (Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 8; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 15). Plaintiff admitted during trial that she had 
knowledge of Defendant's intent to include his premarital home 
under the value of his separate property assets, and this fact was 
substantiated by the testimony of Plaintiff's attorney. (Tr., p. 
72, 11. 12-15; p. 129 1. 23 through p. 130, 1. 22). 
(3) The Warranty Deed was an afterthought by 
the parties, and its provisions are 
patently incompatible with the protection 
provisions contained in the Antenuptial 
Agreement. 
Nearly contemporaneous with the parties' signing of the 
Antenuptial Agreement, Defendant executed and placed Plaintiff's 
name on a Warranty Deed granting Plaintiff a joint interest in his 
premarital home. (Findings of Fact, pp. 3-4, par. 9; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 6) . Defendant's intent in executing the Warranty Deed 
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was solely to secure only those monies Plaintiff paid or would pay 
toward the remodeling of the home. (Tr., p. 151, 11. 15-22). 
Only Plaintiff's attorney advised and counseled the parties 
regarding the execution of the Warranty Deed, and Plaintiff's 
attorney drafted the Deed. (Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 10; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 6). At no time was Defendant's attorney 
present at any of the meetings held between the parties and 
Plaintiff's attorney. (Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 10; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 7). Plaintiff's attorney, moreover, did not send the 
Warranty Deed to Defendant's attorney for his review, nor did 
Plaintiff's attorney speak with Defendant's attorney regarding the 
Warranty Deed. (Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 10; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 7). These facts are substantiated by Plaintiff's 
attorney's testimony at the time of trial and the dates and notary 
acknowledgments of Defendant's signature on the Warranty Deed and 
Antenuptial Agreement. (Memorandum Decision, p. 16). 
Furthermore, the Deed was also drafted and executed with 
extreme haste. The parties were to be married only three days 
after Defendant executed the Deed. (Memorandum Decision, p. 15). 
Clearly, the Warranty Deed was an afterthought by the parties, and 
its provisions are patently incompatible with the protection 
provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement. (Findings of Fact, p. 4, 
par. 11; Memorandum Decision, p. 15). The Antenuptial Agreement 
was clearly intended by the parties to protect their separate 
property. That is precisely why they sought the services of an 
attorney. (Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 11; Memorandum Decision, 
p. 15). As such, because Defendant intended to retain the equity 
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in his premarital home as a separate property asset, the 
Antenuptial Agreement controls this asset. 
e. The post-separation fair market value of 
Defendant's premarital home did not exceed the 
premarital value of the home plus the parties' 
expenditures. 
The value of Defendant's premarital home prior to marriage and 
prior to remodeling was $77,000.00. (Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 
12; Memorandum Decision, p. 7) . Of the $29,993.65 the parties paid 
toward the remodeling, Plaintiff contributed $12,562.65 and 
Defendant expended $11,931.00, plus the $5,500.00 repaid to 
Plaintiff. (Findings of Fact, pp. 4-5, par. 12; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 4), Other than Plaintiff's remodeling expenditures, 
there is no increase in value to attribute to Plaintiff since the 
value of Defendant's premarital home in 1988 plus the amount of 
monies the parties paid toward the remodeling, or $106,993.65, 
exceeds the $105,000.00 fair market value of the home. (Findings 
of Fact, p. 3, par. 7; pp. 4-5, par. 12-13; Memorandum Decision, 
pp. 16-17). 
The above findings clearly support the trial court's decision 
to award Defendant the entire interest in his premarital home and 
to reimburse Plaintiff for the amount she contributed toward the 
remodeling of the home. Given the above findings, the trial court 
acted well within its discretion in concluding that the house was 
Defendant's sole property subject only to Plaintiff's remodeling 
expenditure claim. 
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2. Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish That The Trial 
Court Erred In Awarding Defendant The Entire 
Interest In His Premarital Home. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred: (1) in 
concluding that the Antenuptial Agreement is valid and protects 
Defendant's premarital home; (2) in concluding that the protection 
provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement were not abrogated as to 
Defendant's premarital home when Defendant executed the Warranty 
Deed in favor of Plaintiff and when Plaintiff expended monies 
toward the remodeling of Defendant's home; (3) in concluding that 
it was equitable to return to Defendant the entire interest in his 
premarital home and that Plaintiff should be reimbursed for her 
remodeling expenditures; (4) in concluding that the home did not 
appreciate in value; and (5) in valuing the home as of the date of 
separation and not as of the date of the Divorce Decree. 
a. The trial court properly concluded that the 
Antenuptial Agreement is valid and protects 
Defendant's premarital home. 
Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal-7 that the 
Antenuptial Agreement is invalid since it fails to disclose which 
assets made up Defendant's net worth at the time of marriage,-7 
Plaintiff is mistaken in her contention. 
-
f
 It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that evidence 
will not be reviewed for the first time on appeal. Munns v. Munns, 
790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah App. 1990). Accordingly, this Court should 
strike Plaintiff's argument. 
& Central to Plaintiff's argument is the implied contention that 
the burden of proving fair disclosure is upon Defendant, who is 
seeking to uphold the agreement. Plaintiff is mistaken. Most 
jurisdictions have held that the party seeking to avoid an 
antenuptial agreement has the burden of proving material nondisclo-
sure. In re Marriage of Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Del 
Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962); In re Estate of 
Parish, 236 N.W.2d 32 (1945). 
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In Utah, the critical inquiry is whether the agreement was 
executed after fair disclosure and whether there is an absence of 
fraud or coercion. D' Aston v. D' Aston, 808 P. 2d 111, 112 (Utah 
App. 1990); Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah App. 1988). In 
defining the meaning of "fair disclosure" as it relates to 
antenuptial agreements, the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Estate 
of Lopata, 641 P.2d 952, 955 (Colo. 1982), held as follows: 
Fair disclosure is not synonymous with detailed 
disclosure such as a financial statement of net worth and 
income. The mere fact that detailed disclosure was not 
made will not necessarily be sufficient to set aside an 
otherwise properly executed Antenuptial Agreement. Where 
the agreement is freely executed, the fact that one party 
did not disclose in detail to the other party the nature, 
extent, and value of his or her property will not alone 
invalidate the agreement or raise a presumption of 
fraudulent concealment. [citation omitted]. Fair 
disclosure contemplates that each spouse should be given 
information, of a general and approximate nature, 
concerning the net worth of the other. Each party has a 
duty to consider and evaluate the information received 
before signing an agreement since they are not assumed to 
have lost their judgmental faculties because of their 
pending marriage. 
Id. at 955. 
Under the Lopata Court's definition of "fair disclosure," the 
parties' failure to itemize or list their separate property assets 
does not, in and of itself, invalidate an otherwise valid Antenup-
tial Agreement. Id.—7 
—
f
 See also In re Marriage of Ross, 670 P.2d 26, 29 (Colo. App. 
1983) (holding that husband's failure to disclose value of assets 
is insufficient, standing alone, to invalidate an antenuptial 
agreement based on nondisclosure); In re Marriage of Stokes, 
608 P.2d 824, 827-28 (Colo. App. 1980) (holding that parties' 
antenuptial agreement was valid, even though valuation of husband's 
assets set forth therein was only an approximation, and husband had 
failed to supply itemized list of assets) ; Laird v. Laird, 597 P. 2d 
463, 467-68 (Wyo. 1979) (holding that antenuptial agreement was not 
invalid even though wife allegedly failed to disclose her assets 
prior to execution of agreement). 
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In this case, Plaintiff has failed to proffer evidence 
establishing fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure on the part 
of Defendant. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of 
proof. 
In addition, Plaintiff disregards the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the Agreement and the language 
contained in the Agreement. Recital "C" of the Agreement states: 
Each of the parties has made a full disclosure to the 
other party of all of his or her property and assets and 
of the value thereof, and this Agreement is entered into 
with a full knowledge on the part of each as to the 
extent and probable value of the estate of the other, and 
of all the rights conferred by law on each in the estate 
of the other by virtue of such proposed marriage. 
Additionally, Article 9 of the Agreement recites language similar 
to that set forth in Recital "C" and establishes the approximate 
value of each party's separate property assets. 
By executing the Agreement, Plaintiff certified that she had 
full knowledge of the nature, extent, and value of Defendant's 
premarital separate property. Additionally, prior to executing the 
Agreement, Plaintiff's attorney advised her of her property rights 
and the legal significance and meaning of the Agreement. (Findings 
of Fact, p. 4, par. 10; Memorandum Decision, p. 9; Tr., p. 70, 
11. 6-n). Plaintiff also testified that she had knowledge of 
Defendant's intent to protect his premarital home, as well as his 
other separate property assets, under the provisions and values set 
forth in the Antenuptial Agreement. (Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 
8; Memorandum Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 72, 1. 12 through p. 73, 1. 
4) . This fact was also substantiated by the testimony of 
Plaintiff's attorney. (Tr., p. 72, 11. 12-15; p. 129 1. 23 through 
p. 130, 1. 22). 
s:\mbf\l5102 2 6 
In Berman, 749 P. 2d at 1273, this Court held that antenuptial 
agreements are to be construed and treated in the same manner as 
other contracts. The ordinary and usual meaning of the words used 
is given effect, and effect is to be given to the entire agreement 
without ignoring any part thereof. Giving effect to the language 
of the Antenuptial Agreement entered into by the parties, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the Antenuptial 
Agreement was valid. The evidence clearly shows that prior to 
marriage, Plaintiff had knowledge of the nature, extent, and value 
of Defendant's separate property assets. Furthermore, Plaintiff 
knew that Defendant intended to protect his premarital home under 
the Antenuptial Agreement. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to meet 
her burden of proof and demonstrate that Defendant fraudulently 
concealed his assets. Accordingly, the factual situation present 
here does not justify disturbing the trial court's determination 
and undoing what the parties contractually agreed to accomplish in 
their Antenuptial Agreement. 
b. The trial court properly concluded that the 
protection provisions of the Antenuptial 
Agreement were not abrogated as to Defendant's 
premarital home. 
Plaintiff next argues that the Antenuptial Agreement was 
abrogated as to Defendant's premarital home when Defendant executed 
a Warranty Deed in favor of Plaintiff and when Plaintiff expended 
her separate property monies to remodel Defendant's home. 
In reaching its decision that Plaintiff was not entitled to a 
one-half interest in Defendant's premarital home, the trial court 
held that the Antenuptial Agreement was not abrogated when 
Defendant executed a Warranty Deed in favor of Plaintiff and when 
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Plaintiff expended her separate property monies to remodel 
Defendant's home. 
While Utah courts have not directly addressed the question of 
whether a Warranty Deed with rights of survivorship, executed 
subsequent to an antenuptial agreement, abrogates the terms and 
provisions of the antenuptial agreement, another jurisdiction has 
confronted this very issue. In Peet v. Monger, 56 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 
1953), the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to 
their marriage. Subsequent to the parties' execution of the 
antenuptial agreement, the wife executed a joint tenancy deed which 
contained no language expressly affecting the cancellation of the 
antenuptial agreement. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower 
court's decision by finding that, under the antenuptial agreement, 
the husband had no interest in or control over the joint tenancy 
property unless he survived the wife. See also. In Re: Marriage of 
van Brocklin, 468 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa App. 1991). 
In the case at hand, the Warranty Deed is void of language 
expressly canceling the Antenuptial Agreement. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 10) . In fact, the Deed expressly states that the Deed 
is subject to all existing covenants of whatever nature. (See 
Warranty Deed and Memorandum Decision, p. 10). Additionally, the 
Antenuptial Agreement existed at the time the Warranty Deed was 
executed, and Plaintiff had knowledge that the Antenuptial 
Agreement she executed on June 28, 1988, attempted to control and 
preserve the same property covered by the Warranty Deed. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 10). 
Accordingly, under the Peet decision, and pursuant to the 
language of the Warranty Deed, the trial court did not abuse its 
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discretion in determining that Defendant's execution of the 
Warranty Deed did not abrogate the protection provisions afforded 
his premarital home under the Antenuptial Agreement. 
Plaintiff next argues that the Antenuptial Agreement was 
abrogated when she liquidated and expended her separate property 
monies on the remodeling of Defendant's premarital home. 
In affirming the trial court's decision, this Court held in 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77-79 (Ut. App. 1991), that even 
though a wife had contributed labor and/or assets to her husband's 
premarital property, the property was not converted to marital 
property since the parties had entered into a prenuptial agreement. 
Like the wife in Rudman, Plaintiff claims that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to find that she contributed labor 
and/or assets to Defendant's premarital home, thus converting it to 
marital property. Also, like the wife in Rudman, Plaintiff fails 
to give due regard to the Antenuptial Agreement she entered into 
with Defendant. 
In the case at hand, the trial court found that even though 
Plaintiff had contributed labor and/or assets toward the remodeling 
of Defendant's premarital home, the home was not converted to 
marital property, as Plaintiff contends, since the parties had 
entered into a valid Antenuptial Agreement prior to marriage. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 11) . 
Recital "E" of the Antenuptial Agreement expressly provides: 
Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage or 
dispose separately by gift, will or otherwise, all of his 
or her estate to the same extent as if each of such 
parties remain single. 
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Clearly, by executing the Antenuptial Agreement, the parties 
contractually retained the right to dispose of their separate 
property by contributing the same in support of the other spouses' 
property. Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the 
Antenuptial Agreement was not abrogated when Plaintiff contributed 
her separate property assets toward the remodeling of Defendant's 
premarital home must be upheld. This is especially true in view of 
the fact that the trial court ordered Defendant to reimburse 
Plaintiff for her remodeling expenditures. 
c« It was equitable for the trial court to compel 
Plaintiff to reconvey title to Defendant's 
premarital home and order Defendant to 
reimburse Plaintiff for her remodeling 
expenditures. 
Even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in 
determining the validity of the Antenuptial Agreement, this Court 
must still place a presumption of validity on the trial court's 
equitable property distribution. Hogue, 831 P.2d at 121. 
Utah courts have held that equity requires that each party 
recover the separate property he or she brought into the marriage. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Ut. 1987); Georgedes v. 
Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Ut. 1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 
610 P.2 326, 328 (Ut. 1988); Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 184 P.2d 670 
(Ut. 1947). To this end, trial courts are not bound by the state 
of title to real property prior to the issuance of a divorce decree 
and are empowered to make distributions and compel conveyances as 
are just and equitable. Georgedes, 627 P. 2d at 45; Jackson v. 
Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Ut. 1980); Jesperson, 610 P.2d at 
328; Lundgreen, 184 P.2d at 670. 
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In determining that it was equitable to compel Plaintiff to 
reconvey title to Defendant's premarital home and order Defendant 
to reimburse Plaintiff for her remodeling expenditures, the trial 
court considered all the pertinent circumstances surrounding the 
parties' marriage and, thereafter, looked to such landmark cases as 
Georcredes, 627 P.2d 44, Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, and Lundgreen, 
184 P.2d 670. The trial court found that a common factual theme 
exists between those cases and the case at hand. In each 
situation, the parties were married for less than seven years, no 
children were born into the marriage, both parties had been married 
before, one of the parties either brought a premarital home into 
the marriage or the home was purchased with that party's separate 
funds, title to the home was placed in joint tenancy within the 
first year of marriage, and the other party allegedly contributed 
labor, income and/or assets to remodel or improve the home. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 15). 
In the case at bar, the trial court did not misunderstand or 
misapply the applicable law. The trial court's property distribu-
tion was predicated on facts similar to those found in other Utah 
Supreme Court cases. Furthermore, the trial court's decision that 
Defendant should be awarded his premarital home and order requiring 
Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff for her remodeling expenditures is 
not against the clear weight of evidence. The trial court's 
findings were detailed and clearly supported by the evidence. 
Finally, an abuse of discretion and serious inequity would have 
resulted in this case had the trial court ruled otherwise. 
Clearly, the trial court's equitable property distribution must be 
upheld. 
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d. The trial court properly concluded that 
Defendant's premarital home did not appreciate 
in value. 
Under the rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in Georgedes, 
627 P.2d at 45, Jesperson, 610 P.2d at 328, and Lundgreen, 184 P.2d 
at 670, where one of the parties contributes separate property 
assets to remodel or improve a home brought into the marriage by 
the other spouse, and title to the home is placed in joint tenancy 
within the first year of marriage, it is equitable to return to the 
spouse who contributed their separate property assets to remodel or 
improve the other spouse's premarital home, their actual remodeling 
or improvement expenditures plus one-half of the increase in value 
to the property if such increase exists. 
In the case at hand, the trial court held that Defendant's 
premarital home in 1988, prior to the parties' marriage and any 
improvements, was $77,000.00. (Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 12; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 7). Of the $29,993.65 the parties paid 
toward the remodeling, Plaintiff contributed $12,562.65 and 
Defendant expended $11,931.00 plus the $5,500.00 repaid to 
Plaintiff. (Findings of Fact, pp. 4-5, par. 12; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 4). Other than Plaintiff's remodeling expenditures, 
there is no increase in value to attribute to Plaintiff since the 
value of Defendant's premarital home in 1988 plus the amount of 
monies the parties paid toward the remodeling, or $106,993.65, 
exceeds the $105,000.00 fair market value of the home. (Findings 
of Fact, p. 3, par. 7; pp. 4-5, par. 12-13; Memorandum Decision, 
pp. 16-17). 
The trial court's determination that there is no increase in 
value beyond the parties' remodeling expenditures is clearly 
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supported by the evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not err 
in its decision. 
e. The trial court properly valued Defendant's 
premarital home as of the date of the parties' 
separation. 
In Plaintiff's last point of error, she contends that the 
trial court committed reversible error in relying on her appraisal, 
to valuate Defendant's premarital home as of the date of the 
parties' separation, rather than the date of trial. 
In Morgan v. Morgan, 1993 WL 176214 (Ut. App.), this Court 
held that while the marital estate is generally valued at the time 
of trial, such is not an intractable rule. In Morgan, the court 
was called upon to determine whether the trial court had abused its 
discretion in valuing bank accounts prior to the parties' divorce. 
Id. at page 3. At trial, the husband failed to offer into evidence 
more recent bank statements to rebut the evidence the trial court 
relied on in valuing the property. In upholding the trial court's 
valuation of the property, this Court stated that since there was 
sufficient reliable evidence to support the trial court's finding 
regarding the pre-trial valuation of the bank accounts, as well as 
the husband's failure to provide any documentation to rebut such 
evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Like the 
facts of Morgan, there is sufficient evidence in the case at hand 
to support the trial court's valuation of Defendant's premarital 
home at a time other than trial. 
After their separation in 1990, both parties had Defendant's 
premarital home appraised. Plaintiff's appraisal valued the home 
at $105,000.00, and Defendant's appraisal valued the home at 
$89,000.00. (Tr., p. 216, 11. 6-12). Furthermore, the day prior 
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to trial, the parties executed a Stipulation of Facts. In the 
Stipulation, the parties expressly agreed to allow the trial court 
to use either of the appraisals to determine the net worth and 
decrease of Defendant's separate property assets during marriage. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 5, Stipulation, par. 5) . The parties 
intended for the trial court to rely on and utilize either parties' 
appraisal in determining the value of Defendant's premarital home. 
This fact is substantiated by Plaintiff's testimony at trial and 
the closing argument of her attorney. (Tr., p. 27, 1. 25 through 
p. 28, 1. 8; p. 216, 11. 6-21). In reaching its decision that the 
value of Defendant's premarital home was $105,000.00 as reflected 
in Plaintiff's appraisal, the trial court relied on the only 
evidence presented at trial, the parties' appraisals. 
Similar to the facts of Morgan, Plaintiff failed to offer into 
evidence an appraisal valuing the home as of trial. Like the 
husband in Morgan, Plaintiff now comes before this Court and claims 
"foul play," only after she realized that the trial court did not 
rule in her favor by awarding her one-half of the value of 
Defendant's premarital home. Like the facts in Morgan, there is 
sufficient evidence in the case at hand to support the trial 
court's valuation of the property at a time other than trial. This 
is especially true in view of the fact that the trial court adopted 
and relied on Plaintiff's appraisal in valuating the home. 
It should also be noted that Plaintiff cites no authority for 
the proposition that a trial court may not consider appraisals made 
prior to the date of trial in valuing real property. While this 
Court has yet to address this exact question, other jurisdictions 
which normally require marital property to be valuated at the time 
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of trial have held that appraisals made before the date of trial 
may be used to determine the value of marital real property. Finch 
v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex.App. 1992) (holding trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in relying on an appraisal made one 
year prior to date of divorce, in valuing real property for 
purposes of dividing marital property); In re Marriage of 
Feisthamel, 739 P. 2d 474, 479 (Mont. 1987) (holding trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in adopting wife's appraised value of the 
marital home, where appraisal was performed two years prior to 
trial). Furthermore, whether an appraisal is near enough in time 
to the date of divorce to be considered in determining the value of 
the property is a question which should be left to the discretion 
of the trial court. In Re Marriage of Feisthamel, 739 P. 2d at 479. 
Accordingly, under the Morgan, Finch and Feisthamel decisions, 
similar to the facts of Morgan, Plaintiff failed to profer evidence 
at trial which would rebut the evidence before the court, the 
parties' appraisals. Like the husband in Morgan, Plaintiff now 
comes before this Court and claims "foul play," only after she has 
realized that the trial court did not rule in her favor by awarding 
her one-half of the value of Defendant's premarital home. Like 
Morgan, there is sufficient evidence in the case at hand to support 
the trial court's valuation of the property at a time other than 
trial. 
Accordingly, this Court must hold that the trial court did not 
err in valuing Defendant's premarital home at a time other than the 
date of trial. 
s:\mbf\15102 35 
C. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DEFENDANT 
ATTORNEYS' FEES, AND DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL. 
In her Appellate Brief, Plaintiff mistakingly argues that 
there is no other basis for the trial court's award of attorneys' 
fees to Defendant than Plaintiff's failure to accept Defendant's 
offer of judgment. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1989), a court may award 
attorneys' fees in a divorce proceeding, as long as the award is 
based on evidence as to the receiving spouses' financial need, the 
ability of the paying spouse to pay the fees, and the reasonable-
ness of the award. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 
(Ut. 1988). Furthermore, the decision to make such an award and 
the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Id. at 1336. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's representations, the facts in this 
case adequately supports the trial court's decision to award 
Defendant attorneys' fees. In pertinent part, the trial court 
found: (1) Defendant has been unemployed in a full-time position 
since October 1991 (Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum 
Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 159, 11. 6-11); (2) that as of the time of 
trial, Defendant was not able to meet his financial obligations and 
was borrowing $500.00 to $600.00 per month from his children 
(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 20; Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3; 
Tr., p. 161, 11. 7-17; p. 172, 11. 16-19; and (3) that Defendant 
suffers from knee problems which preclude him from seeking full-
time employment in his area of training, auto-body repair (Findings 
of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3, 15; Tr., p. 
170, 11. 3-5; p. 193, 1. 25 through p. 195, 11. 1-4). 
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Additionally, Defendant's attorneys submitted Affidavits in 
support of the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees generated on 
the case. (Memorandum Decision, p. 18). It should be noted that 
the amount requested by Defendant's attorneys were only a portion 
of the fees and costs Defendant incurred during the case. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court found that the amounts 
set forth in the Affidavits were fair and reasonable under the 
circumstances; $2,360.00 for the legal services of Mr. Peel and 
$2,289.00 for the legal services rendered by Ms. Brown. Accord-
ingly, the trial court ordered Plaintiff to pay to Defendant's 
attorneys the sum of $4,649.00. (Memorandum Decision, p. 18). 
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 
Plaintiff to pay only a portion of Defendant's attorneys' fees. 
Additionally, this Court has held that when fees in a divorce 
case have been awarded below, fees may be awarded to that party who 
then substantially prevails on appeal. Bell v. Bell, 810 P. 2d 489, 
494 (Ut. App. 1991), and Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 
1991). In the case at bar, Defendant was awarded attorneys' fees 
below and upon substantially prevailing on appeal, Defendant should 
be awarded the attorneys' fees he has incurred on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the trial court in 
this matter should be affirmed, and this Court should enter an 
order awarding Defendant his attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this day of July, 1993. 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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